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Abstract: The paper focuses on the 
interaction between ethics and ontology, 
particularly with regard to social ethics and 
social ontology. By presenting some initial 
assumptions, which relate to Kant, Popper 
and Searle (among the others), the paper 
investigates the topic of  reality as a human 
meaning activity. According to the 
perspective of  social ontology, the paper 
hypothesises the existence of  a set of  
objects, whose reality depends on a couple 
of  criteria – interaction and sociality. Given 
these two criteria, the paper analyses the 
connection between social ontology and 
ethics, with the aim to show whether 
morals can be intended as a human 
production and, therefore, as a moral 
practice. If  this is the case, then ethics has 
not to do with truth, but with other 
content: the paper tries to outline a moral 
criterion based on social utility, according 
to a specific philosophical tradition that 
follows Darwin’s theories, going from Rée 
to Dewey’s pragmatism. The goal of  the 
paper is to outline the possibility of  a new 
approach to ethics as system of  standards 
of  evaluation, passing by a new definition 
of  reality, connecting truth to utility, and 
considering the role played by social 
agreement, which renders ethics a matter 
of  standards. 
Key-words:  ethic, social utility, moral 
practice. 
Qual é a realidade? Significado, 
Socialidade e Moral 
Resumo: O artigo aborda a interação entre 
ética e ontologia, nomeadamente em 
matéria de ética e ontologia sociais. Ao 
apresentar alguns pressupostos iniciais, que 
se relacionam com Kant, Popper e Searle 
(entre outros), o trabalho investiga o tema 
da realidade como uma atividade de 
significado humano. De acordo com a 
perspectiva da ontologia social,  o artigo 
tem por hipótese a existência de um 
conjunto de objetos, cuja realidade 
depende do par de critérios: interação e 
sociabilidade. Tendo em conta estes dois 
critérios, o artigo analisa a relação entre 
ontologia social e ética, com o objetivo de 
mostrar se a moral pode ser concebida 
como uma produção humana e, portanto, 
como uma prática moral. Se este for o 
caso, então a ética não tem a ver com a 
verdade, mas com outro conteúdo. O 
artigo procura delinear um critério moral 
baseada na utilidade social, de acordo com 
uma tradição filosófica específica que segue 
as teorias de Darwin, passando por Rée, 
até o pragmatismo de Dewey. O objetivo 
do texto é delinear a possibilidade de uma 
nova abordagem para a ética como sistema 
de normas de avaliação, passando por uma 
nova definição da realidade, conectando 
verdade a utilidade, e considerando o papel 
desempenhado pelo acordo social, o que 
torna a ética uma questão das normas. 
Palavras-chave: ética, utilidade social, 
prática moral 
What Is Reality? Meaning, Sociality, and Morals 
1. ‘The Meaning Instance’ and ‘The 
Social Construction’ 
In order to try to answer this question, it is 
a preliminary point the definition of  
humans as ‘meaning beings’ is a 
preliminary point. Humans are labellers, 
definers, symbolisers, interpreters, map 
designers and creators of  worlds. In these 
specific terms, humans might be intended as 
gods. Humans describe their surrounding 
realities, put elements in order, attempt to 
control and predict their behaviour, assign 
tasks and functions to other humans and 
animals, in order to solve several issues, 
such as: what can I eat? Where can I find 
drinkable water? Can I trust that person? 
How can we assign duties to fortify the 
village? What therapy is more efficient to 
stop that disease? Which strategy can we 
adopt to surprise enemies? What school 
can I choose for my daughter? What bank 
can I open my account at? 
If  we want to answer these questions and 
other infinite demands of  life, we have to 
attribute a meaning to those things first: 
what a bank and a bank account are, that is 
what it is possible to do with them. Thus, 
we get a first assumption: humans possess a 
primary instance, which I call the meaning 
instance, a sort of  Kantian faculty of  
imagination, which is both productive and 
reproductive (1781, B152). The direct aim 
of  this instance is the organization of  
sensible materials in constant and 
consistent forms beyond Kant’s thesis, 
which had been expressed through the 
example of  cinnabar (1781, A100-1), since 
constancy is not given by the persistence 
of  the qualities by which an object is 
present and caught by a sensible intuition; 
instead, it is caught by the social 
contamination of  sensible and pure 
intuitions. This implies a second assumption: 
reality is a social construction. 
Humans set gardens and fields where to 
sow and plant herbs and trees; they settle 
farmhouses and fences for animals, which 
are grouped in herds, selected and 
classified in tables and taxonomies, in 
order to distinguish and identify them; they 
build industries and factories, where 
precise and ordered production sequences 
are planned and applied; they measure 
roads, draw lines, put signals, set driving 
codes; they regulate communications, 
professional works, economic transactions; 
they design geographic maps and mark 
meridians, parallels, tropics and circles on 
them; they make navigation and weather 
charts and draw isobars, isotherms and 
other lines on them; they build devices that 
can make them see or hear what cannot be 
present on a map (telescopes, radars, 
sonars); they group languages in different 
categories and assign them to races and 
territories; they distinguish races and 
territories; they search for new planets, 
stars, and forms of  life and when they can, 
they classify, label, measure; they create and 
use several units of  measure, so that 
everything can be measurable, even poems 
and songs, by metrics, verses, strophes or 
duration; they create alphabets, languages, 
codes and cryptographies; they are 
obsessed by time measurement: they make 
numerous tropic, lunar, revolutionary, or 
Advent calendars; they define solstices and 
equinoxes; they count the duration of  the 
sidereal year and the duration of  the year 
on other planets; they refer to zodiac, 
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distinguish seasons, celebrate the new 
year’s day in different dates, acclaim diverse 
feasts, set months, weeks and days and 
attribute specific meanings to some of  
them; they count hours, minutes, and 
seconds and, sometimes, they fractionate 
them by multiples or submultiples; they use 
equivalence classes so that what is 
measurable can be converted in other 
unities of  measure; they set coins, bills, 
currencies, and conversion indexes; they 
invent fairy-tales, myths, and stories to 
explain what has not a clear meaning yet; 
they call ‘mysteries’ what has not any 
meaning yet; they create institutions, 
nations, political orders and theories on 
them; they create religions, philosophies, 
ideologies, ideas, and values. 
1.1. The set of  real objects: ℛ  
All this implies a first consequence of  my 
theses: the meaning nature is the tool by 
which humans make reality that we know 
and I call it ℛ, the set of  real things, which 
are meaningful. They are the things that 
make sense and can be used in any kind of  
interaction – practical or ideal. I try to 
better explain what this set is: who is used 
to natural or country life can easily observe 
several instances of  the making of  reality. 
For example, magpies make their nest by 
using grass yarns, sticks, and mud. Other 
species, such as owls, tend not to make a 
nest, but to exploit clefts and natural 
shelters or artificial structures. In both 
case, these birds make their world on 
account of  the material they have found in 
their environment. It is unlikely that a 
young Pygmy might want to establish a ski 
centre in his/her village, as it is unlikely 
that a young Swiss might want to thank 
god Kmvum for having made thunders go 
away. 
As Rica made Usbek notice, 
il me semble, Usbek, que nous ne jugeons 
jamais des choses que par un retour secret 
que nous faisons sur nous-mêmes. Je ne 
suis pas surpris que les nègres peignent le 
diable d’une blancheur éblouissante et leurs 
dieux noirs comme du charbon; que la 
Vénus de certains peuples ait des mamelles 
qui lui pendent jusques aux cuisses; et 
qu’enfin tous les idolâtres aient représenté 
leurs dieux avec une figure humaine et leur 
aient fait part de toutes leurs inclinations. 
On a dit fort bien que, si les triangles 
faisaient un dieu, ils lui donneraient trois 
côtés (MONTESQUIEU, 1721: 126). 
If  triangles could make that god, they 
would not use but the material they have: 
angles and sides for an amount of  three, 
maybe scalene and bad, or isosceles and 
vindictive, or equilateral and omniperfect. 
It is unlikely to think that triangles would 
make a bearded god – not because of  lack 
of  imagination – but because they would 
also make reality from the surrounding 
material and nobody has never seen 
bearded triangles so far. 
This is the common element within the 
whole universe: that everything cannot be 
but included in it. It is not possible to 
calculate without having to do with 
numbers; and it is not possible to talk 
about the sea without any – direct or 
indirect – experience of  it. Even 
imagination cannot work but with the 
surrounding material: a unicorn is a 
synthesis, by adding a horn to a horse; 
Pegasus adds wings instead; and Chimaera 
too is a combination of  real animals. 
So, ℛ is the totality of  the world that an 
individual can know. It is unlikely that a 
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young Bushman knows a DVD, so s/he 
will barely interact with it: presumably, s/
he will not desire to buy a DVD player or 
to establish a DVD rental shop in his/her 
village. In this case, I say that DVDs do 
not belong to his/her ℛ. Nonetheless, 
DVDs exist for billions of  humans, who 
interact with them in different ways: they 
buy or rent them, they share or sell them, 
they watch and discuss them, they try to 
copy them, some collect them, someone 
might want to use them as coasters to 
avoid glasses leave a ring on the table. 
All this implies a second consequence: infinite ℛs exist. Reality is not only one. Giordano 
Bruno’s hypothesis of  infinite worlds was 
correct, but it had to be shifted to this 
world, not outside. This means that it is 
possible to say of  anything that it exists 
just because some people believe it exists. 
The issue does not necessarily concern 
Berkeley’s idea of  the falling tree that 
makes no noise in absence of  eyewitnesses; 
the fact is that the mere existence of  
objects that do not belong to anyone’s 
particular ℛ does not change the situation: 
many people happily live with no 
knowledge of  logarithms or square roots 
and that black hole at several light years of  
distance from us does not affect our lives 
somehow – so far. 
What makes the difference is the meaning, 
the sense that we can attribute to 
something. So, for example, Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics is the typical instance of  
something that begins to exist after 
deciding the position and name of  the 
books at a library. This has partially to do 
wi th Sear le ’s d i s t inct ion between 
constitutive and regulative rules. Beyond 
Searle, the power of  beliefs, conventions, 
habits, and social practices has to be raised 
to ontological reality. Crusades, witch 
hunts, stakes, and the Holocaust are tragic 
examples of  what humans can do on 
account of  their beliefs, which are 
abso lute ly independent f rom any 
adherence to any kind of  truth, since truth 
is not a requisite for the efficacy of  a 
belief. From this standpoint, we must 
consider metaphysics and unicorns as true 
as subatomic particles, Magritte’s pipe, 
Higg’s boson, soccer games, the Chinese 
theatre of  shadows, and the Golden Fleece 
held in Colchis.  
1.2. World 3 and ℛ: two conditions for 
reality 
As it is known, Popper stated that all 
objects belonged to three different worlds. 
I will not discuss here that particular set 
that was Popper’s World 3. What is 
interesting to me about it concerns the 
possibility of  interactions with the objects 
belonging to it; particularly, I wonder 
whether the reality of  the objects of  World 
3 is given by the mere possibility to interact 
with them. According to Popper, this 
seems to be a sufficient reason: «I call it 
‘real’ because it interacts with us and with 
physical things. Interaction seems to me to 
be a kind of  not perhaps necessary, but 
sufficient criterion of  reality» (POPPER,
1994: 17). So, what is interaction? If  an 
interaction would suffice to guarantee the 
reality of  an object, then even a 
schizophrenic person might want to claim 
that all his mental creations are real, since 
he can somehow interact with them. 
Therefore, besides interaction, what makes 
a difference is the objectivity of  
knowledge, that is its publicity, its sociality, 
i.e. the fact that it is shared among the 
members of  a community. At this point, 
we get to the necessary condition for the 
reality of  things: sociality – which matches 
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my second assumption, reality is a social 
construction. 
Given the two conditions for the reality of  
all objects – interaction and sociality – it is 
true that not all objects have the same 
value or importance. As Maslow affirmed 
(1997), there is a pyramid or hierarchy of  
needs: only after having satisfied the 
primary (basic) needs  - water, food, shelter 
– the individual will try to consolidate 
them and attempt to satisfy secondary 
(metaneeds) necessities – self-esteem, 
participation, aesthetic and intellectual 
potential. On account of  this distinction, 
Ingleheart (1997; 2005) outlined an analysis 
on ‘material values’ and ‘post-material 
values’ – then changed into ‘survival 
values’ and ‘free expression values’. 
The proper definition of  ‘survival’ is a 
complex argument itself. We could 
certainly agree with Debord’s view, that 
“l’abondance des marchandises, c’est à dire 
du rapport marchand, ne peut être plus que 
la survie augmentée” (DEBORD, 1967: 
25). The ‘augmented survival’ – which was 
connected to the double shift from the 
proletarian to the spectator and from the 
capital to the spectacle within the neo-
Marxist views – can reveal a basic difficulty 
in defining primary and secondary needs. 
The new technological devices – computer, 
smartphone, or tablet – do not directly 
affect the possibilities of  what we were 
used to define ‘survival’, but they certainly 
shape the ‘augmented survival.’ Anders 
wondered who could do without the so 
called ‘goods of  obligation?’ 
Diese Rede von ‚musts‘ ist aber 
vollkommen berechtigt: denn das Fehlen 
eines einzigen solchen „must“-Geräts 
bringt die gesamte Lebensapparatur, die 
durch die anderen Geräte und Produkte 
festgelegt und gesichert wird, ins Wanken; 
wer sich die ,Freiheit‘ herausnimmt, auf  
eines zu verzichten, der verzichtet damit 
auf  alle und damit auf  sein Leben. 
„Man“ könnte das? Wer ist dieses ‚man‘? 
(ANDERS, 2002: 2). 
  
After all, the agreement on what is to be 
considered as a primary good or need is 
almost impossible without a previous 
understanding of  what ‘survival’ means. It 
is not necessary to further analyse the 
difference between biological necessities – 
water, food, shelter – and social needs, as 
Rawls well explained: 
For simplicity, assume that the chief  
primary goods at the disposition of  society 
are rights and liberties, powers and 
opportunities, income and wealth. […] 
These are the social primary goods. Other 
primary goods such as health and vigor, 
intelligence and imagination, are natural 
goods (RAWLS, 2009: 62). 
So, at this point we have a distinction 
between natural primary goods and social 
primary goods. I explain the co-existence of  
them – both necessary for the human 
sur v iva l – through my f i r s t two 
assumptions, the meaning instance and the 
social construction. The first assumption 
allows us to identify what is apt for the 
sake of  survival – drinkable water, edible 
food, useful or dangerous animals, 
convenient practices and methodologies 
for hunting, fighting, building, and so on – 
while the second one permits us to 
communicate and share this knowledge, in 
order to classify it, ameliorate it, and shape 
more and more complex systems. 
This particular process recalls what 
sociologists use to call ‘socialization.’ 
Particularly, Annick Percheron – and also 
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Dubar (1997) – outlines an interesting 
model, which is an evolution of  Piaget’s 
and Durkheim’s views: 
Toute socialisation est le résultat de deux 
processus différents; processus d’assimilation 
et d’accommodation. Par l’assimilation, le 
su j e t ch e r che ra i t à mod i f i e r s on 
environnement pour le rendre plus conforme 
à ses désirs […]; par l’accommodation, au 
contraire, le sujet tendrait à se modifier 
pour r épondr e aux pr e s s i ons d e 
l ’ env ir onnement (PERCHERON, 
1974:26). 
According to this point of  view, both the 
meaning instance and socialization are slow 
and long-term processes of  construction 
of  symbolic codes, which make interaction 
with ℛ’s elements possible, along pathways 
that are always new and unpredictable. 
Each individual “se la compose lentement, 
en empruntant certaines images aux 
diverses représentations existantes, mais en 
les réinterprétant pour en faire un tout 
original et neuf ” (PERCHERON, 1974: 
26). It is important to remark that the 
meaning instance works in parallel with the 
socialization process and anticipates it, 
because the individual has to set meanings 
before sharing and comparing them. 
2. Is morals truth or real? 
2.1 Morals in ℛ 
All this I presented so far implies a third 
consequence: morals is a social practice, which 
depends on the above-mentioned ‘meaning 
instance.’ As hypothesis, we could affirm 
that the reality that we make is the whole 
of  the answers we offer against the issues 
that we face everyday: should I offer a ride 
to that hitcher? What doctor should I go to 
for my check-up? The weather does not 
look very promising: should I fetch my 
umbrella? Should I share the information 
about my friend? The combination of  all 
our answers is our reality, our world, 
both the physical and social worlds. In 
matters of  health, animal husbandry, 
horticulture, carpentry, education of  the 
young, and a host of  other practical 
domains, we regularly figure out what we 
ought to do based on the facts of  the case, 
and our background understanding. I have 
a horrendous toothache? I ought to see a 
dentist. There is a fire on the stove? I 
ought to throw baking soda on it. The 
bear is on my path? I ought to walk 
quietly, humming to myself, in the 
orthogonal direction. […] Humans 
encounter similar problems on a regular 
basis—in buying a car, designing a 
dwelling, moving to a new job, selecting 
whether to opt for an aggressive treatment 
for metastasized cancer, or hospice care. In 
any case, that most problem-solving is not 
deduction is clear. Most practical and 
social problems are constraint satisfaction 
problems, and our brains often make good 
decisions in figuring out some solution. 
[…] Not necessarily the best solution, but 
a suitable solution (CHURCHLAND ,
2011: 7). 
In these terms, morals works as a language, 
which is the main tool of  the meaning 
instance: language is the human response 
to the need for meaning and operates as a 
problem-solver. So does morals, which is a 
human code to attribute meaning to the 
surrounding world and regulate human 
practices. Therefore, morals belongs to ℛ, 
since it is a human product, just like 
science theories, religions, political models 
or art trends. 
The belonging to ℛ has nothing to do with 
the content of  truth: it just focuses on 
Revista de Filosofia Moderna e Contemporânea                                    
Brasília, vol 4, nº 1, 2016.                                                                              61
Massimo Vittorio                                                                                            !  
meaning. As Dewey stated, «the best 
definition of  truth from the logical 
standpoint which is known to me is that of  
Peirce: “The opinion which is fated to be 
ultimately agreed to by all who investigate 
is what we mean by the truth, and the 
object represented in this opinion is the 
real” (DEWEY, 1986: 343). 
So, morals is certainly real just like the 
g e o c e n t r i c t h e o r y a n d m e d i e va l 
bloodletting are: all theories, including 
those ones that we consider unacceptable 
and with no followers nowadays, have 
responded – for a shorter or longer time – 
to the same need for sense and meaning 
and they worked for some people over 
time. If  the context changes and new 
elements enter, then a theory can be 
modified or even discarded. This 
distinction between meaning and truth 
conveys the Kantian difference between 
belief  and knowledge, i.e. between reason 
(Vernunft) and intellect (Verstand). In similar 
terms, Hannah Arendt has shown that 
truth and meaning do not overlap:  
The need of  reason is not inspired 
by the quest for truth but by the 
quest for meaning. And truth and 
meaning are not the same. The basic 
fallacy, taking precedence over all specific 
metaphysical fallacies, is to interpret 
meaning on the mode l o f  t ru th 
(ARENDT, 1981: 15). 
Arendt quotes Heidegger in order to 
remind that often philosophy falls into this 
metaphysical fallacy: “„Sinn von Sein“ und 
„Wahrhe i t de s Se in s“ s ag en da s 
Selbe” (HEIDEGGER, 1998: 19). 
2.2. Moral truths and social utility 
As I wrote so far, the reasons for our 
beliefs do have not a link to truth; they are 
practical, social, emotional reasons. The 
motives for the construction of  our beliefs 
are the same for the construction of  reality 
and they are grounded in a binary system: 
social utility in relation with individual well-
being. 
For the sake of  biological and epistemological 
survival it is not important that a statement is 
true: what is important is its utility. What is 
utility? Survival; at all levels – let us remind 
the distinction between ‘primary needs’ 
and ‘metaneeds,’ for example. For survival 
is supported by the belonging to a group, it 
basically means survival of  the group 
which an individual belongs to. In other 
terms, this means that utility is always 
intended to be social utility. 
Maybe the first and best work on the 
relationship between morals and social 
utility is by Paul Rée and his Origin of  the 
moral sentiments, which is a sort of  tribute to 
Darwin’s theory. Nonetheless, the most 
complete and stimulating analysis on this 
topic is the one offered by John Dewey. 
According to Rée and Dewey, Darwin’s 
theory has produced a main effect on 
morals: it has brought it back to the field 
of  material conditions and practical 
existence. As Dewey states,  
physics, chemistry, history, statistics, 
engineering science, are a part of  
disciplined moral knowledge so far as they 
enable us to understand the conditions and 
agencies through which man lives, and on 
account of  which he forms and executes his 
plans. Moral science is not something with 
a separate province. It is physical, 
biological and historic knowledge placed in 
a human context where it will illuminate 
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and guide the activities of  men 
(DEWEY, 1983: 204). 
 And in the last chapter of  his 1922 
work, Dewey affirms that  
all morality is social; not because we ought 
to take into account the effect of  our acts 
upon the welfare of  others, but because of  
facts. Others do take account of  what we 
do, and they respond accordingly to our acts. 
Their responses actually do affect the 
meaning of  what we do. The significance 
thus contributed is as inevitable as is the 
effect of  interaction with the physical 
environment. […] Our conduct is socially 
conditioned whether we perceive the fact or 
not. […] Morals is as much a matter of  
interaction of  a person with his social 
environment as walking is an interaction of  
legs with a physical environment. The 
character of  walking depends upon the 
strength and competency of  legs. But it also 
depends upon whether a man is walking in 
a bog or on a paved street, upon whether 
there is a safeguarded path set aside or 
whether he has to walk amid dangerous 
vehicles. If  the standard of  morals is low it 
is because the education given by the 
interaction of  the individual with his social 
environment is defective (DEWEY, 
1983,:217 ff). 
For morals is dependent upon education, 
which is dependent on material (physical, 
social, political, economic) conditions, it is 
a scientific discipline, such as chemistry or 
physics, because – just like them – it is the 
basic tool that humans use in order to 
describe their world, the interactions 
occurring in it and to try to regulate them 
recurring to principles and commandments; 
the mistake is to take them as elements not 
belonging to the world they come from 
and pu t them in a hypo the t i c a l 
metaphysical world where they have never 
been. 
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